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a misprint, because North Korea did not 
invade South Korea until June 1950�
These items are minor and easily 
corrected in a future edition� What 
remains still is a powerful book that 
goes into great detail, benefiting 
from the storytelling ability of H� W� 
Brands� We hope that a civil-military 
conflict between a towering figure like 
MacArthur and a sitting U�S� president 
is unlikely to reoccur� Yet the story 
remains a valid one today, with its les-
sons on the reach of military power in 
a democracy, the role of the president 
in setting national policy, and the role 
of civilian oversight of military power�
DAVID L� TESKA
The Pacific War and Contingent Victory: Why 
Japanese Defeat Was Not Inevitable, by Michael 
W� Myers� Lawrence: Univ� Press of Kansas, 2015� 
208 pages� $34�95�
The Pacific War and Contingent Victory 
is “an exercise in the elucidation of 
terms”—an exercise necessary to 
determine whether the Empire of 
Japan could have avoided defeat at the 
hands of the United States and its allies� 
The focus on “terms” is important, 
as precision and clarity are vital to 
Professor Michael Myers’s effort to 
challenge the near-universal acceptance 
of the idea that Japanese defeat was 
inevitable� On the contrary, Myers 
argues that there were several points 
in the war where the arc of history was 
subject to change, given a different mix 
of luck, skill, will, or strategy� Myers’s 
book takes aim at British historian H� 
P� Willmott—a leading proponent of
the inevitability school—and Willmott’s
assertion that since “the defeat of 
Japan was assured” no single battle or 
campaign can be considered “decisive�” 
The Pacific War and Contingent 
Victory challenges this conventional 
view that inherent industrial, financial, 
and demographic shortcomings all 
but guaranteed Japanese defeat�
Myers is also careful to argue that, 
while the Japanese could have avoided 
defeat, this does not mean necessarily 
that they ultimately could have gained 
victory� Rather, Japan might have 
realized outcomes short of actual defeat, 
such as an armistice preserving some 
of the gains made early in the war, a 
return to the status quo ante bellum, or 
even a negotiated surrender that left 
Japan more intact than it would be when 
it ultimately did surrender in 1945�
Myers’s challenge to Willmott and the 
rest of the proponents of inevitable 
Japanese defeat is built on an insistence 
on precise terms: as he explains, all that 
is required is to show that there was the 
slightest chance of a Japanese victory, 
however long the odds or improbable 
the required chain of events� If, even 
under the most remote of conditions, 
a different outcome could have oc-
curred, then the inevitability argument 
is defeated� Myers then argues that if 
defeat was not a certainty, then one 
or more events—be they battles or 
campaigns or just a moment of good 
or ill fortune—had to be decisive� It is 
difficult, perhaps even impossible, to 
argue with Myers’s logic� His position 
is somewhat similar to that of a lawyer 
defending the owners of a carnival who 
offer a commonly found midway game 
involving tossing softballs into milk cans 
for prizes� All the lawyer has to do is 
show that it is possible for the softball to 
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go into the can, even if the likelihood of 
that happening is as close to zero as one 
can get, and no one ever wins a prize�
Myers produces ample evidence to prove 
his point� He notes that even Willmott 
himself acknowledges that a German 
victory in Europe could have enabled 
Japan to achieve something other than 
defeat in the Pacific� If the avatar of 
inevitability admits the possibility of 
an alternative outcome, what else is 
needed to carry the argument? However, 
the clarification that Japanese defeat 
was nearly inevitable versus simply 
inevitable is a distinction without a 
difference� If this were all there was to 
Myers’s book, it would be scant reward 
for the cost of purchase or the time 
spent reading it� Luckily there is more�
The Pacific War and Contingent Victory 
identifies a number of ways by which 
Japan might have avoided defeat� 
These include a United States willing 
to settle for a negotiated conclusion 
in the face of mounting casualties 
and war weariness� Greater success 
against Australia, which Myers argues 
could have been achieved, perhaps 
combined with a successful invasion 
and occupation of Hawaii, might have 
been another means to a different end�
In sum, Myers’s book—which has 
been used in the Naval War College’s 
curricular case on the Pacific theater 
in the Second World War—by focusing 
on war’s contingent nature, illustrates 
well the oft-noted maxim that in war 
the enemy truly does “get a vote�”
RICHARD J� NORTON
O U R  R E V I E W E R S
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